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Dial M for Murder: A case of passion killing, 
criminal evidence and sultanic power in 
Medieval India
Abstract: This paper considers the structures and applications of the criminal ju-
dicial system in the Islamic Later Middle Period as it developed in India under the 
sultans of Delhi (1200–1400 CE). A fundamental issue in crime and punishment is 
the relationship between sultanic power and religious authority. Particularly at 
stake in this relationship is the question of who can sanction the highest form of 
punishment, i.e. the death penalty (siyāsa). Contemporary historians and schol-
ars in the study of religion investigating the relationship between sharīʿa and 
siyāsa to reveal the extent and limits of sultanic power show a system of gover-
nance that allowed for the delegation of authority, particularly in the area of the 
judiciary, from the sultan down to viziers and judges. Some scholars depict the 
relationship between the ʿulamāʾ and the sultan as a kind of stand off. The actual 
dynamics of legal jurisdiction were much more complex. This study proposes a 
new interpretive framework for understanding the relationship between political 
power and religious authority through a critical analysis of the criminal judicial 
system, law, and historical narrative. In particular, I consider a murder case de-
scribed by Shams al-dīn Sirāj ʿAfīf in one of the most significant histories written 
in the later Delhi Sultanate, the Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī. 
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In Alfred Hitchcock’s 1954 thriller film Dial M for Murder, Grace Kelly plays Margot 
Wendice, the wife of a jilted husband, who plans to murder her when he uncovers 
an extramarital affair. To carry out this ghastly task he contrives to hire a lowlife 
collegiate acquaintance with a predilection for unseemly business. Together they 
plot to strangle her and make it look like a break-in that went disastrously awry. 
Fundamentally, it is a crime of passion motivated by sexual jealousy and a desire 
for revenge. Crimes of passion are certainly not new or particularly unusual in 
history except when they occur with Hitchcockian flare in medieval Islamic his- 
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toriographical literature. This was my surprise when I came across a particu- 
larly gruesome tale of murder in Shams al-dīn ʿAfīf’s (b. ca. 757/1356) Tārīkh-i 
Fīrūzshāhī. ʿ Afīf, like most Muslim literati of premodern India, came from a family 
that served in the royal court. He chose to focus his literary energies on the reign 
of Fīrūz Shāh (r. 752/1351–790/1388), one of the most accomplished and successful 
sultans of India. Although generally referred to as a history, ʿAfīf’s work fits more 
within the biographical genre referred to as manāqib. It is a singular biography of 
the great Sultan and not the dynastic account of imperial lineages of kings. ʿAfīf 
was at the forefront of innovation in courtly literature, partially demonstrated by 
his interest in murder. Until this time, manāqib literature was reserved for the 
subjects of religious scholars, prophets, and Sufi shaykhs, but not sultans.1 He 
likely composed the history during the uncertain period following Amir Timur’s 
sacking of Delhi in 801/1398, a catastrophic event that contributed to the demise 
of Delhi as a center of Islamic empire in South Asia.
In his history, ʿAfīf describes a particularly atrocious crime that occurred at 
some point late during the reign of Fīrūz Shāh. It is found within the thirteenth 
chapter in a special section concerning two separate cases where the Sultan as-
sumed the role of judge in two murder cases. This particular case is noteworthy as 
it is the longest legal narrative found in any of the 13th- and 14th-century histories 
of the Delhi Sultanate. It is a rare example that includes specific details of the 
criminal and investigative procedures. Particularly of interest is the fact that he 
details an example of siyāsa, the sultan’s authority to administer punishment re-
lating to cases of governance and public order.2 The 14th century was especially 
important in the evolution of legal thinking on the relationship between siyāsa 
and sharīʿa, which also lead to important writings on siyāsa sharīʿa, a legal frame-
work that further codified and legitimized the sultan’s legal jurisdiction within 
sharīʿa.3 Overall, ʿAfīf frames his description of Fīrūz Shāh’s judicial involvement 
in these cases by emphasizing the Sultan’s great compassion and careful deliber-
ation in delivering his legal rulings. The historical narrative is given in full here to 
provide the background necessary to discuss what can be understood of criminal 
law and sultanic power during the 14th century in North India. ʿAfīf begins the 
story in this manner. 
1 Hardy 1960: 41.
2 For a discussion of siyāsa as punishment within Islamic law see Peters 2005: 67–68. 
3 For a general overview of siyāsa sharīʿa see Hallaq 2009: 200–203. Yossef Rapoport has made 
a strong case for the significant role siyāsa played in the Mamlūk legal system saying “the siyāsa 
of the state was not only an integral and legitimate element of the shariʿah, but also an increas-
ingly central one.” (Rapoport 2012: 102).
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During the last period of the reign of Fīrūz Shāh there was one Khvājah Aḥmad, an account 
keeper working in the royal treasury. Now, a tutor used to come to his house to educate the 
Khvājah’s children. The tutor’s own house was in the city of Delhi proper, while Khvājah 
Aḥmad’s house was in the city of Fīrūzābād. Over time, a love affair (qazī̤ya-yi muḥabba) 
developed between Khvājah Aḥmad and the tutor. As it happens, Khvājah Aḥmad became 
suspicious that the tutor was betraying him. Actually, the tutor was in love with a woman 
and heartbroken.
 The tutor used to visit Fīrūzābād every Saturday. He would stay there for five days 
spending his time teaching the children. On Thursdays he would then return home to Delhi. 
One of the nights, the conniving Khvājah Aḥmad, along with two of his young slave boys 
( ghulām) with whom he had made friends, engaged the tutor in a drinking bout. As he 
became drunk with wine the three of them, by surprise, jumped the unfortunate tutor, wres-
tled him to the ground, and slit his throat. That same night they dragged the body out of the 
house and threw it over the Malik Bridge, which is on the road to Salora.4 In a panic they 
gave their blood stained clothes to the washerman for cleaning. 
 By chance, the very next day, at the crack of dawn, Sultan Fīrūz Shāh passed over 
that bridge. He stood there looking at the corpse. Straight away, the Sultan ordered a thor-
ough investigation of the incident, setting the gears of government in motion. During those 
days Malik Nek Āmidī, who was the city magistrate (kotwāl ), had passed away. Now his son, 
Malik Ḥusām al-dīn, held the office. The exceptional Sultan summoned Malik Ḥusām al-dīn 
to that exact spot and said to him with these very words, “If you don’t find this dead person’s 
killer I will kill you instead.” Malik Ḥusām al-dīn was completely and terribly shocked by 
this order and began to consider how he would pursue the trace of this killing in order to 
make the arrest. 
 In the meantime, the dead man’s body was washed. The blood was wiped from his 
face and the head was reattached to the body. His corpse was put out to rest in public view 
in the hope that someone would identify it. An announcement was made requesting infor-
mation concerning the residence, profession, and place of birth of the deceased. Soon a 
huge crowd of people gathered. All the inhabitants of Fīrūzābād showed up for the specta-
cle. Suddenly someone came forward and making a statement (taqrīr), testified in the name 
of God as to the identity of the dead man. He claimed that the dead man’s house was in the 
Siri fort area, in such and such a neighborhood. Malik Ḥusām al-dīn having found a clue 
sent his men to the Siri fort. After making some inquiries they found the house of the de-
ceased. When the unfortunate family heard the news they all set out for Fīrūzābād. Upon 
reaching there and seeing the body they were terribly distraught and broke down in tears. 
They told the kotwāl that he had been teaching the children of Khvājah Aḥmad. Recently, 
the aforementioned Khvājah secretly fancied the dead man. Perhaps it was because of his 
attraction to the deceased that blood was shed. 
 Khvājah Aḥmad was brought before the kotwāl of the kingdom. He flatly denied the 
allegations. The kotwāl brought these matters before his sovereign ruler. The Shāh ordered 
him to put pressure on Aḥmad’s household servants to give information. Under pressure 
4 The Archeological Survey of India identifies Salora with Sidhora, north of Delhi near Khiz-
rabad along the Yamuna River. Cunningham 1871: 161–162.
 670   Blain Auer  
they came out with the truth that Khvājah Aḥmad, along with two young slaves, had gone 
out drinking somewhere with the deceased. It was then that they killed him. Then the two 
slaves, who were the companions of Khvājah Aḥmad, were brought forward. They con-
fessed (iqrār) saying, “We grabbed the tutor but Khvājah Aḥmad slit his throat.” Khvājah 
Aḥmad retorted, “These slaves are lying. I didn’t kill him, they did.” Then the slaves coun-
tered by saying, “The Khvājah’s blood-stained cloths were left with the washerman.” 
 When the washerman was called he brought the washed clothes of the Khvājah, which 
were splattered all over with yellowish blood-stains. The Khvājah was questioned about 
this. He claimed that the stains were from an animal sacrifice. Then the Sultan ordered that 
the butchers be called forward. When the butchers arrived they were shown the blood-
stains. When they saw them they told the Sultan, “These yellow stains are not from an 
animal but resembled those of a man’s blood, as only human blood turns a shade of yellow 
after washing.” After the butchers had given their statement (taqrīr) the Sultan sentenced 
the murderer Aḥmad to death (siyāsa) on the spot. 
 Khvājah Aḥmad threw himself at the feet of the Chief Minister (khvājah jahān). He in-
sisted on an appeal, “I will give eighty-thousand tankas in blood money (bahāʾī khūn, the 
money paid to the relations of a person killed, as an atonement) as compensation.” The 
Chief Minister brought the appeal to the attention of the Sultan noting that Khvājah Aḥmad 
was ready to pay eighty-thousand tankas in blood money. Sultan Fīrūz Shāh, with due fear 
of God, the Almighty and Merciful, observed, “Oh foolish Vizier! Whosoever possessed the 
power of wealth would shed blood without fear if they could. Muslims would turn to killing 
and the life of people will be put to great risk. And before the Throne of Judgment on the Day 
of Resurrection they would be shamed.” Thereafter, the Chief Minister told the Sultan that 
there were thousands of tankas in the royal treasury that the Khvājah is accountable for. 
Several days would be needed to get the financial record in order so that the funds of the 
royal treasury not go missing. The Sultan commanded, “Do not be worried on account of 
thousands, put the Khvājah to death (siyāsa).” In short, Khvājah Aḥmad and the two young 
slaves were put to death (siyāsa) in public view. The royal justice was done.5 
1 Murder cases in Delhi Sultanate historiography
This story of Khvājah Aḥmad is a unique case that provides insight and raises 
important questions about crime and punishment in the Delhi Sultanate.6 Narra-
tives detailing the crime of murder in historiography of the period are not all that 
common. In fact, all in all there are only five instances of documented cases of 
homicide in historiographical literature of the Delhi Sultanate. Z̤iyāʾ al-dīn Baranī 
(ca. 684/1285–758/1357), ʿAfīf’s predecessor and author of the Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī, 
5 ʿAfīf 1888: 504–508 and ʿAfīf, 2001: 272–274.
6 For a general overview of the classical view Islamic criminal law see Peters 2005: 6–68. For a 
detailed discussion of punishments see Lange 2008:179–243.
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a work that shares the same title as ʿAfīf’s history, and considered by many to be 
the most important history produced during the Delhi Sultanate, documents two 
murder cases. The first instance that Baranī notes is the case of Malik Baqbaq, a 
close associate of the Sultan Ghiyās al-dīn Balban (r. 664/1266–686/1287), leader 
of four thousand horsemen, and landholder of Badāʾūn. He was held responsible 
for killing his servant under the influence of alcohol, beating him to death with 
a whip (dirra).7 The Sultan Ghiyās al-dīn Balban ordered that Malik Baqbaq like-
wise be executed by flogging in front of the victim’s wife. Baranī notes that the 
execution was performed on the determination of the victim’s wife, in what 
appears to be an instance of qiṣāṣ, or retributive justice under Islamic law. In a 
separate case, Baranī details the murder committed by Haybat Khān, the land-
holder of Awadh, and vassal to Sultan Balban. He had also killed someone while 
drunk. The murderer was flogged upon the determination of the deceased’s 
family members. He was then turned over to the victim’s wife who was given the 
opportunity to execute Haybat Khan. In the end they settled on a blood price of 
twenty thousand tankas, in what also appears to be another instance of qiṣāṣ.8 
Barani stresses throughout that the imposition of justice in these two cases was 
an example of Ghiyās al-dīn Balban’s impartiality even when it came to the pun-
ishment of his close associates. 
Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (703/1304–770/1369), the great traveler of the premodern age, de-
scribes in his famed travelogue, the Riḥla, that while staying in Delhi during the 
reign of Muḥammad b. Tughluq (r. 724/1324–752/1351) he became aware of a case 
in which a slave murdered his master. It was an incident of particular concern for 
Ibn Baṭṭūṭa because it involved a runaway slave of his own who perpetrated the 
crime. Kamāl al-dīn ʿ Abd Allāh al-Ghārī, an ascetic Sufi whom Ibn Baṭṭūṭa visited, 
dissuaded him from reacquiring the slave just before he had committed the homi-
cide. The culprit was brought before Sultan Muḥammad b. Tughluq who turned 
the murderer over to the family of the deceased, who was then put to death, in 
another case of qiṣāṣ.9 
In addition to the case of Khvājah Aḥmad, ʿAfīf documents only one other 
case of murder that occurred during the reign of Fīrūz Shāh. It is the story of a 
7 Baranī, 1862: 40 and Elliot / Dowson, 1871: 3:101.
8 Baranī, 1862: 40–41.
9 See Baṭṭūṭa 1971: 3: 627. Curiously Ibn Baṭṭūṭa relates, through Ibn Juzayy (ca. 721/1321–
758/1357), a very similar event that supposedly occurred during his travels in Nishapur. See 
Baṭṭūṭa 1971: 3: 584–585. For further cases of public violence documented by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa during 
the reign of Muḥammad b. Tughluq see Waines 2007: 231–246.
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conflict that arose between the two sons of Malik Yūsuf Bughra, a prominent 
member of Muhammad b. Tughluq’s court. The sons of Yūsuf Bughrā were from 
two different mothers. The elder brother killed the younger to ensure his full in-
heritance. The mother of the younger son brought the allegation before Sultan 
Fīrūz Shāh’s court. For this criminal offence the Sultan ordered qiṣāṣ, or retribu-
tive justice.10 Although there is no specific mention of what punishment was de-
livered to Yūsuf Bughrā’s elder son, as noted in the previous cases, Islamic law 
dictates a physical punishment equal to the crime or compensation with blood 
money (bahāʾī khūn, Pr., diya, Ar.). Qurʿānic justification for al-qiṣāṣ, or retribu-
tive justice, refers to it as a deterrent to protect lives. As it says in Q2:17 “And there 
is [a saving] of life for you in al-qiṣāṣ, O men of understanding.”11 Qurʾānic justi-
fication is also found in Q17:33 which states, “And do not kill the soul which Allah 
has forbidden, except by right. And whoever is killed unjustly – We have given his 
heir authority, but let him not exceed limits in [the matter of] taking life. Indeed, 
he has been supported [by the law].” According to Baranī, writing in the Fatāvā-yi 
jahāndārī (Edicts of world rule), there are only three generally agreed upon cases 
within Ḥanafī jurisprudence, the school of law to which the majority of Muslim 
scholars in South Asia adhere, where the death penalty is permitted: wrongfully 
killing another Muslim (qatl-i muslim), apostasy (irtidād ), and unlawful sexual 
intercourse (zinā).12 All the preceding cases were legal examples of qiṣāṣ, retalia-
tory punishment for the unlawful killing of humans, i.e. homicide and intentional 
bodily harm.
2 Criminal legal procedure in the Sultan’s court 
Clearly there are many dramatic elements in the murder case of Khvājah Aḥmad 
that make it worthy of the historian’s attention. An intriguing feature of this case 
is the sexual motivation for committing the homicide. ʿAfīf’s insinuation that 
Khvājah Aḥmad had sexual desires for the tutor and that the tutor was in love 
with an unidentified woman adds to the sensational current of the story. Homo-
sexual behavior was frowned upon in medieval Islamic societies and it found 
acceptance in certain contexts, “patterns of homosexuality” varying greatly 
10 ʿAfīf 1888: 503–504 and ʿAfīf 2001: 271–272.
11 For an overview of capital punishment in Islamic law see Lange 2011. Further Qurʾānic refer-
ences dealing with murder and punishment are discussed in Haleem 2003: 97–108.
12 See Baranī 1961: 58–59.
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across different communities.13 Was there, for instance, another hidden purpose 
in the evening of drinking with the treasurer, tutor, and the two young slaves? The 
historian hints at a much larger undercurrent of sexual violence and exploitation. 
Narratives of sex, slaves, and violence are common enough in Islamic historiogra-
phy and at times they involve murder. Clifford E. Bosworth notes, “In considering 
the personal relationship between master and slave, the sexual aspect should 
certainly not be neglected; the ethical climate of Persia in this period condoned 
homosexual liaisons […] and the master of youthful slaves was well-placed for 
indulging unnatural and sadistic tastes. Resentments aroused by practices of this 
kind seem to have been behind the murder in 541/1146 of Zangī b. Ak Sonḳur. 
Zangī’s personal guard was drawn from the sons of the great men of the Turks, 
Greeks and Armenians, whose fathers he had killed or banished; he had then 
kept the sons after castrating them to preserve their boyish and beardless appear-
ance. These ghulāms had long sought an opportunity for revenge, and eventually 
assassinated him (Bundārī, 208–9).”14 In another context of the Delhi Sultnate, 
Peter Hardy notes that “The Hindū Khusraw Khān Barwarī, recipient of the 
homosexually-inspired favours of Sultan Mubārak Shāh Khaldjī, murdered his 
master (720/1320) and assumed the throne before being deposed by the free 
malik, Ghiyāth al-dīn Tughluḳ.”15
One of the interesting threads tying these various narratives of murder and 
judicial punishment together is the major role that slaves played in the social 
polity of the Delhi Sultanate.16 Slaves occupied all levels of society in pre-modern 
India. ʿAfīf notes the ubiquity of slaves saying, 
Some of the slaves spent their time in reading and committing to memory the holy book, 
others in religious studies, others in copying books. Some with the Sultan’s leave, went to 
the temple at Mecca. Some were placed under tradesmen and were taught mechanical arts, 
so that about twelve-thousand slaves became artisans (kāsib) of various kinds. Forty thou-
sand were every day in readiness to attend as guards in the Sultān’s equipage or at the 
13 See Murray / Will 1997: 7. For an excellent study of various cultural attitudes towards homo-
erotic acts in early modern Islamic societies see Khaled El-Rouayeb, Before Homosexuality in the 
Arab-Islamic World, 1500–1800. Particularly relevant is a brief discussion of education. See 
El-Rouayeb 2005: 34–36.
14 Bosworth 1965.
15 See Hardy 1965.
16 Much research on the institution of slavery in premodern Islamic South Asia has focused on 
the pervasive use of military slaves. For instance see Kumar 2006: 83–114 and Jackson 2006: 
63–82.
 674   Blain Auer  
palace. Altogether, in the city and in the various fiefs there were one hundred and eighty- 
thousand slaves, for whose maintenance and comfort the Sultān took especial care.17
In these murder cases, the involvement of slaves in a period of their universal 
presence was clearly a state issue and a deep concern for the ruling dynasties. In 
murder cases involving slaves legal matters were generally more complex. For 
instance, the blood price for a slave depended upon the value of the slave to his 
owner.18 The treatment of evidence and the admission of testimony were different 
than in cases involving free individuals, however, under Ḥanafī law, free and 
slave are equally liable for murder.19 There is also the complicating factor of the 
multiple participants in the murder and who is ultimately culpable.20 
The principles regarding the sharīʿa legal procedures that govern cases of 
criminal law are given in the classical Islamic juridical works as well as important 
later medieval fatāvā collections compiled at the behest of ruling Muslim sultans 
and amirs during the Delhi Sultanate, such as the Fatāvā-yi Fīrūzshāhī, Fatāvā-yi 
Ghiyāsiya, and Fatāvā-yi Tatarkhāniya.21 ʿAfīf’s story contains a number of im-
portant details of criminal legal procedure regarding confession, testimony, and 
evidence. The involvement of the kotwāl in the gathering of evidence, the calling 
and questioning of witnesses, and documenting the facts of the case are equally 
important. The kotwāl was the key imperial officer designated to maintain law 
and order in the city environs. He was appointed by the sultan to gather evidence 
in criminal prosecutions. ʿAfīf carefully details the efforts made by the kotwāl to 
identify the victim of the crime, as well as to certify the testimony of a witness 
with an oath. In this case, the family members are called to properly identify the 
victim. It is through their testimony (taqrīr) that the accused, Khvājah Aḥmad, is 
summoned for questioning. Ḥanafī jurisprudence established guidelines on a tri-
partite gradation of admissible evidence: tawātur – complete corroboration and 
verification from multiple witnesses, āḥād – testimony of an individual, and iqrār 
– admission of guilt, confession. The legal bar for establishing evidence could 
differ depending upon the crime perpetrated. For instance, under sharīʿa, confes-
sion by the accused of a crime must be voluntary and cannot be coerced. How-
ever, during siyāsa proceedings there appears to be some difference of opinion 
17 ʿAfīf 1888: 270. See Elliot / Dowson 1871: 3: 341. ʿAfīf dedicates a chapter to discussing the 
place of slaves during Fīrūz Shāh’s reign. See ʿAfīf 1888: 267–273. 
18 Anderson 1951: 815.
19 Hallaq 2009: 321. Also see Peters 2005: 47.
20 Peters discusses a case of murder victim who was attacked by two assailants and the com-
plexities of who was responsible for the cause of death. Peters 1990: 106–107.
21 For an overview of the fatāvā literature of the Delhi Sultanate period and details on its devel-
opment see the collected articles in Islam 2005.
  Dial M for Murder   675
about the admission of testimony obtained under coercion.22 It was in this period 
that there was a shift in legal thinking on the permissibility of torture in the act of 
acquiring a confession.23 Under a sultan’s jurisdiction the sharīʿa rules of evi-
dence need not apply.
The question of coercion in this case was in regard to the admission of evi-
dence. Household servants were pressured to produce information concerning 
the murder. What exactly was the nature of that pressure is not specified. It is the 
young slaves that provide a confession (iqrār) of their participation in the crime, 
but do not admit to carrying out of the murder itself. There is no hint in the text 
that the suspects were coerced in any fashion into making this confession and 
their confession alone would not have been sufficient to produce a guilty verdict 
against the accused. Not least noteworthy, in the spectacular nature of this case, 
is the premeditated naked intentionality of the murder. Ḥanafī scholars distin-
guish between five degrees of intention in cases of murder: ʿamd – intentional, 
shibh ʿamd – manslaughter,24 khaṭāʾ – accidental, majrā al-khaṭāʾ – cause of an 
accident, bi sabab – indirect, that is causing the accidental death of another 
through an unlawful act.25 The choice of weapon in this case is significant, as 
within Hanafi law it is a further indicator of the intent of the perpetrator.26 
The details of testimony in this case are complicated by the fact that Khvājah 
Aḥmad accuses the slaves of perpetrating the murder and falsely implicating 
him. Further evidence is needed to establish his guilt. The case then turns to a key 
piece of forensic evidence, the admission of the bloodstained clothing of Khvāja 
Aḥmad as an exhibit. The mere presence of the bloodstains, as incriminating as it 
may be, was not enough to conclusively shut the case. It took a further piece of 
forensic medicine and expert testimony to secure Khvājah Aḥmad’s guilty convic-
tion.27 Expert testimony was an established legal practice within the Ḥanafī tra-
dition at least as early as the 11th century.28 Butchers were brought into the court 
22 Peters 2005: 82–83.
23 See Johansen 1996: 123–168 and Johansen 1998: 173–202.
24 Cases of shibh ʿamd are generally determined by the use of a weapon that under usual cir-
cumstances does not cause death.
25 See Hallaq 2009: 320–321 and Anderson 1951: 818.
26 Rudolf Peters notes in a study of 19th century Hanafi law in Egypt that “criminal intent (ʿamd ) 
[…] must also be apparent from the kind of weapon or object used to kill.” See Peters 1990: 103. 
Also Knut S. Vikør notes “Ḥanafī law distinguishes between ‘intent’ and similarity to intent’, 
defined by what weapon is used; a sharp weapon such as a knife or sword proves intent to kill.” 
Vikør 2005: 288n23.
27 Fahmy 1999: 2.
28 Citing examples from the Mabsūṭ of Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Sarakhsī (d. ca. 490/1096). See 
Johansen 2002: 174.
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from the community to submit their opinion on the origins of the bloodstains. The 
butchers’ opinion concerning the bloodstains contradicted the claim of Khvājah 
Aḥmad and indicated that he had perjured himself before the court. The use of 
expert witnesses to determine the facts of the case played a critical role in deter-
mining the Sultan’s legal ruling. Following this rigorous legal process and only 
after having established the guilt of the accused beyond a “shadow of a doubt” 
does the Sultan issue his final judgment of siyāsa, or capital punishment. 
A final distinctive feature of this case is the process of appeal following the 
Sultan’s ruling. Khvājah Aḥmad has recourse to the Chief Minister by offering to 
pay blood money as compensation for the murder. According to sharīʿa, the pay-
ment of blood money was an alternative to the death penalty in cases of murder 
and is indicated by the Qurʾānic passage Q4:92 which states, “blood money is to 
be paid to his kin” (diyatun musallamatun ilā ahlihi). The Chief Minister brought 
the request to the attention of the Sultan who rejected it. This is particularly inter-
esting considering the example given earlier where Barani describes the accep-
tance of blood money in lieu of execution, in another example of qiṣāṣ. Khaled 
Abou El Fadl notes that, “Schools that considered diya to be a co-equal alterna-
tive to qiṣāṣ did not require the offender’s consent to paying the diya; the choice 
was entirely that of the victim or the heirs.”29 A critical question in the case of 
Khvājah Aḥmad is were the family members of the victim consulted concerning 
the offer of compensation, or did the Sultan’s judgment supersede the wishes of 
the relatives of the deceased? This is a particularly important detail regarding 
qiṣāṣ as Rudolf Peters notes, “According to the Hanafites and Malikites they [the 
victim’s heirs] only have the right to demand retaliation or to forfeit this right, 
thereby pardoning the killer.”30 As it appears that the offer of compensation was 
not made to the victim’s heirs, the Sultan’s decision ran against the basic princi-
ples of qiṣāṣ. He defends his ruling by arguing that to permit the diya in this par-
ticular case, a well-healed courtier would elude a murder charge simply by paying 
his way out.31 Fīrūz Shāh’s rejection of the offer for blood money is an extension 
of the jurisdiction of the sultan’s authority into an area of sharīʿa law, by reason 
of the position of Khvājah Aḥmad within the court and the Sultan’s direct involve-
ment in the discovery of the body.32
29 El Fadl 2004. 
30 Peters 2005: 45–46.
31 For further of diya see Vikør, 2005: 287–290.
32 Rapoport refers to the sultan’s intervention through siyāsa justice, in a Mamlūk legal case, as 
a means to “plug” a “legal loophole” in Ḥanafī jurisprudence. Rapoport 2012: 84.
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3  The Sultan as judge and jury in cases of capital 
punishment
What is significant in the five instances of murder cases from the Delhi Sultanate 
is that all are illustrations of crimes and punishments where a sultan is function-
ing in the role of qāzī̤, or judge. Four of the cases fall clearly within the Islamic law 
of qiṣāṣ, but handled under the Sultan’s jurisdiction. In contradistinction, the 
principal case of this discussion was treated under siyāsa. In general, siyāsa 
rulings issued from the office of the sultan were related to crimes of state, such 
as rebellion, and understood to be not directly discernable with reference to the 
Qurʾān or ḥadīth. These cases offered a wider range of judicial interpretation.33 In 
this area of law there was frequently a jurisdictional overlap in the sharīʿa and the 
body of laws subsumed within the za̤vābit, used variously in the Islamic middle 
period in the sense of imperial legal codes, and referred to as qānūn in the early 
modern period, particularly in the Ottoman context.34 Illustrative of the context 
of the Delhi Sultanate, Richard Repp writes of the Ottomans, 
The thrust of kanun legislation lay broadly in three directions. The first was an area which, 
by the time of the Ottomans, had come to be fairly widely accepted as one lying largely out-
side the bounds of the seriat, one where the right of the ruler to legislate in the public inter-
est was recognized, namely such matters as the organization of the court and army, taxation 
and land law, and the relationship of the individual to the state. The second important area 
of Ottoman kanun-making was criminal law. Less obvious outside the scope of the seriat 
than the first, the considerable activity of the Ottoman sultans in the field of criminal law 
was held (on one occasion, at any rate) to be required by an increase in crimes.35 
As such, the medieval Islamic judicial system operated on a legal dualism that 
bifurcated jurisdictions into the realms covered by the sharīʿa and court rulings or 
za̤vābit.
In specific cases that fall under the sultan’s jurisdiction the rules for issuing 
severe punishment were more expansive under siyāsa than sharīʿa. Frank Vogel 
writes, “[r]ulers claimed, and most fuḳahā’ acknowledged, authority in certain 
circumstances to punish siyāsatan, meaning that the ruler has authority to punish 
severely and peremptorily, without observing even the few general limits as to 
33 For further discussion of the understanding of siyāsa and the related punishments in the 
Delhi Sultanate particularly relating to rebellion see Auer 2009: 238–255.
34 Inalcik 1969: 105–138. For a case study of the influential Ottoman Hanafi jurist Ebussuud 
Efendi (c. 896/1490–982/1574) that details a number of his legal opinions in the cases of homicide 
see Imber 1997: 236–268.
35 Repp 1988: 124–125.
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punishments and procedures imposed by fiḳh.”36 This kind of jurisdictional rela-
tionship was established early in Islamic legal texts that delineated spheres of 
legal influence. This was the case with the development of Mālīkī law where “The 
Mālikīs acknowledge that the sulṭān is, in general, invested with judicial power, 
the great majority of legal cases treated in their works under the jurisdiction of 
the qāḍī, the sulṭān’s function is generally confined to that of an executive in the 
qāḍī’s court.”37 Therefore, these examples that recorded cases treading upon 
jurisdictional boundaries were treated with great attention in the sources of the 
period. Examples of capital punishment were remarkable and if a sultan was ex-
cessive in the administration of siyāsa their actions were frequently viewed 
askance by historians as demonstrations of the abuse of power in the office of the 
sultan. 
It has been noted in different contexts that the 14th century is distinctive in 
terms of developments of Islamic law. Baber Johansen demonstrates that in 
Mamluk Egypt there was a deviation from classical legal thinking regarding 
proofs and procedure during this same period. He writes, “they regard the dispen-
sation of justice as a function to be fulfilled by all members of the political elite. 
Consequently, judgments can be based not only on fiqh norms but also on politi-
cal considerations and state interest.”38 He sees the overarching thrust and object 
of this new legal doctrine as “serving to protect the public interest and the ability 
of the public authorities to control disturbances and lawlessness.”39 This judicial 
turn was represented in the 14th-century development of siyāsa sharīʿa, character-
istic of the legal thought of the Ḥanbalī jurists Ibn Taymiyya (661/1263–728/1328) 
and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (691/1292–751/1350). 
4 Conclusion
In the case of Khvājah Aḥmad, did the historian deliberately select two particu-
larly different examples of murder trials with the specific intent to highlight the 
dual legal categories of qiṣāṣ and siyāsa? It is difficult to say with absolute cer-
tainty, but the weight of the preceding discussion would indicate that he did. ʿ Afīf 
makes the important legal distinction himself in his retelling of the two murder 
cases. The Sultan’s own explanation for his ruling can be read to further indicate 
36 Vogel 1998.
37 Yanagihashi 1996: 42–43. Yanagihashi goes on to note that in specific cases the sultan “acted 
as a judge”.
38 Johansen 2002: 180.
39 Johansen 2002: 180.
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that the case as a whole reflects the legal development of siyāsa sharīʿa in 14th- 
century Delhi Sultanate. It is particularly more noteworthy with the effect that in 
Barani’s history Fīrūz Shāh was said to have abandoned capital punishment 
(tark-i siyāsa) during his reign.40 Barani distinguishes the sharīʿa-mindedness of 
Fīrūz Shāh with his predecessor Muḥammad b. Tughluq who he describes as 
more willing to exceed the bounds of sharīʿa.41 Fīrūz Shāh expressed views on 
strict sharīʿa adherence in the Futūḥāt-i Fīrūzshāhī.42 The principles of his reign 
were inscribed into a dome of the congregational mosque in Fīrūzābād in a public 
proclaiming of his religious convictions. This can also be understood as a symbol 
of his rule being in concert with ancient Indian forms of kingship.43 With Fīrūz 
Shāh’s turn towards a “purified” sharīʿa he was perhaps participating in the de-
bates opposing what was perceived as the rigid normativity of the legal texts, fiqh 
legalism, in favor of the spirit of the law. Johansen notes that the principle moti-
vation and belief in the move toward siyāsa sharīʿa was that “[a] return to the 
example of the charismatic members of the early community is the only way in 
which the practical validity of the sacred law in a Sunni state can be restored.”44 
This is perhaps further indicated by the way ʿAfīf summarized the murder tale, 
quoting a ḥadīth of the Prophet Muhammad, “A moment of justice is better than 
sixty years of worship (ʿibāda).”45 
In conclusion, there are many pieces of information that add to the unusual 
and sensational dimensions of the murder case of Khvājah Aḥmad. The depth 
with which the historian recounts the details of the case indicates an increased 
interest in legal matters and deep concern about the justice and fairness of the 
criminal procedure. The narrative exposition of testimony, confession, evidence, 
witnesses, experts, forensics, and the operations of the Sultan’s judicial system 
makes it the most singular and systematic exposition of sultanic juridical proce-
dures and punishments produced in the medieval period in India. It tells us much 
about the relationship between the ruler and the elite members of his court as 
well as the general populace. It is perhaps the strongest example of the legal 
development of siyāsa sharīʿa in the history of Islamic South Asia from the 14th 
century. While ʿAfīf’s narrative of homicide never made the silver screen like 
40 Barani 1862: 572.
41 For details of this discussion see Auer 2009: 241–244.
42 Fīrūz Shāh 1941a: 61–89 and Fīrūz Shāh 1941b: 449–464.
43 K. A. Nizami was the first to connect this inscription to the pillar edicts erected by Asoka. 
Nizami 1974: 28–35. Finbarr Flood also treats the continuity and continuation of ancient Indian 
notions of kingship into the Islamic period in his study of pillars and inscriptions in the context 
of South Asia. Flood 2003: 95–116.
44 Johansen 2002: 186.
45 ʿAfīf 1888: 508.
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Hitchcock’s Dial M for Murder, it shows that tales of murder and intrigue are more 
revealing than ever of the cultural and social norms of the society of the times.
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